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American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 1 
Grand Strategies in War and Peace. Edited by Paul 
Kennedy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. 
228p. $25.00. 
The present volume can be seen as a form of follow-on 
study to Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 
seeking to present, elaborate, and apply the concept of 
grand strategy to a set of case studies dealing with great 
powers. Kennedy attempts to define and conceptualize 
grand strategy in the opening chapter and applies it to 
the American experience in the tenth, and last, chapter. 
Three studies of British grand strategy make up chapters 
2-4, followed by five chapters on the "Continental 
powers." The latter group varies substantially in time 
frame and clarity of focus, with chapters on the Roman 
Empire, the decline of imperial Spain, the "military 
heritage of modern Germany" across a broad time span, 
France in 1914 and 1940, and the Soviet Union. 
Kennedy succinctly notes the purpose of the vol- 
ume-"to present the reader with historical case studies 
of 'grand strategy'; that is to say, with assessments of 
the success or failure with which various powers of 
Europe sought to integrate their overall political, eco- 
nomic, and military aims and thus to preserve their 
long-term interests" (p. ix). Unfortunately, this brief 
statement of grand strategy (elaborated in chap. 1) also 
provides an idea of the overly ambitious task assigned to 
the volume's central concept. I wish to assess the value 
to political scientists interested in the study of interna- 
tional relations, and especially international conflict, of 
this volume by historians (with two exceptions). 
The core of such an assessment must be the meaning 
and utility of the concept of grand strategy. Following 
Edward Mead Earle and Liddell Hart, Kennedy presents 
grand strategy as a way to relate means to ends: "The 
crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in 
the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all 
of the elements, both military and non-military, for the 
preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term 
(that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests" (p. 5; 
emphasis original). "All of the elements" include the full 
use and assessment of diplomacy; questions of national 
will, morale, and political culture; and the full range of 
economic resources, including industry, finance, man- 
power, and wealth. 
It is obvious that in attempting to deal with this 
concept, Kennedy is continuing themes and issues 
raised in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. The concept 
returns to the linkages between economic resources, 
military capability, and the costs of defense. It returns to 
questions of diplomacy, resources, and priorities-that 
is, the constituent elements of "overstretch," a central 
component in Kennedy's explanation of the process of 
great power ascendance and decline. 
At the same time, it is also obvious that grand strategy 
is related to significant areas of interest to students of 
international relations: the meaning and measurement 
of power, the role of alliances, the relationship of power 
to military and diplomatic success, the relationship 
between domestic and foreign politics, and the rele- 
vance of such broad perspectives as realism, rational 
choice, and bureaucratic politics. 
What appear to be strengths of grand strategy, how- 
ever, are its major weaknesses. As a concept, what does 
grand strategy add to well-established concepts, mod- 
els, or frameworks in international relations? As noted, 
the concept is too broad, tries to do too much, and lacks 
the theoretical guidance of other approaches. Broad 
frameworks that integrate across various levels of anal- 
ysis exist, for example, in Rosenau's pretheory and in 
the geopolitical work of the Sprouts linking environment 
and environed unit. (These approaches apply particu- 
larly to chapters 1, 7, and 8). The considerations of 
ends-policies to means-resources is the heart of ex- 
pected utility and other rational choice approaches (from 
formal game theoretic work, to Allison's Model I, to 
standard realist formulations). Problems of resource 
extraction-control over resources-and its conse- 
quences for control over actors and outcomes are central 
to the literature on power and influence (and well 
developed in the work of Organski and Kugler). Prob- 
lems with organizational parochialism and operating 
procedures (as seen in the studies on the Roman Em- 
pire, Germany, and the Soviet Union) are well handled 
by Allison's Organizational Process Model II, especially 
as contrasted to the Rational Actor Model I. 
In sum, while grand strategy appears to be about how 
military policy relates to overall governmental domestic 
and foreign policy, it does not specify any of the ways in 
which these things should be related. It lacks the theo- 
retical specifications that other conceptual models, 
frameworks, and formulations provide. Indeed, none of 
the studies attempts to define or conceptualize grand 
strategy. The studies do, however, attempt to approach 
their subjects from some broad understanding of grand 
strategy. Herein lies the volume's utility; it presents a set 
of studies which have moved from what Lijphart has 
called atheoretical case studies to interpretative case 
studies and that now have the potential to be used by 
the informed reader in the role of either hypothesis- 
generating case studies or what Eckstein has called 
heuristic case studies. 
University of South Carolina HARVEY STARR 
A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Tru- 
man Administration, and the Cold War. By Melvyn P. 
Leffler. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992. 
689p. $29.95. 
A Preponderance of Power will be of immense value to 
scholars interested in the grand strategy of the Truman 
administration. Leffler has combined a solid grasp of 
secondary material with a comprehensive and very 
carefully documented analysis of primary sources, in- 
cluding a vast array of previously classified documents. 
The result is not only a more complete record of U.S. 
policymakers' thinking about national security but also a 
more nuanced and sophisticated reconstruction of their 
concerns and objectives. 
Leffler convincingly argues that policymakers believed 
that U.S. national security required "an external envi- 
ronment compatible with their domestic vision of a good 
society" (p. 13). The lessons drawn from the rise of 
fascism, the Depression, and World War II were that 
closed economic and political systems were not only 
incompatible with "the nation's core values" and the 
viability of the U.S. political economy but also created 
the potential for military threats that could grow into 
global wars of attrition if countries with closed systems 
gained control of areas with significant human and 
material resources. U.S. policymakers believed the So- 
viet Union created exactly that kind of threat because it 
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